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Abstract- According to Network Effect literature network ex-
ternalities lead to market failure due to Pareto-inferior coordina-
tion results. We show that the assumptions and simplifications 
implicitly used for modeling standardization processes fail to 
explain the real-world variety of diffusion courses in today’s 
dynamic IT markets and derive requirements for a more gen-
eral model of network effects. We argue that Agent-based Com-
putational Economics provides a solid basis for meeting these 
requirements by integrating evolutionary models from Game 
Theory and Institutional Economics. 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE STATUS QUO 
It is common in many markets that the buying decision of 
one consumer influences the decisions of others. Interde-
pendencies such as the bandwagon, snob, and Veblen effect 
are broadly discussed in economic literature (e.g. Leibenstein 
1950, Ceci/Kain 1982). Besides these general effects apply-
ing to all the consumer decisions, some markets are deter-
mined by strong positive network effects, the so called de-
mand-sided economies of scale, deriving from the need of 
product compatibility. This means that the willingness to 
adopt a product innovation correlates positively with the 
number of existing adopters. Popular examples are the infor-
mation technology and telecommunication markets. The 
network effects in these markets mainly originate from two 
different areas, the need for compatibility to exchange infor-
mation or data and the need for complementary products and 
services. Parallel with the growth of the telecommunication 
and information technology markets in recent years, a new 
area of research emerged aiming at explaining the phenom-
ena of strong positive network effects in markets and their 
implications on market coordination and efficiency. We will 
refer to this research field as the theory of positive network 
effects.  
The primary goal of most traditional approaches is an 
analysis of particular properties of modern information and 
communication technologies, i.e. increasing returns to mar-
ginal adopters, or network effects (e.g. Farrell/Saloner 1985, 
Katz/Shapiro 1985, Besen/Farrell 1994). Thus, the particular-
ity of network effects lies in the fact that they are considered 
to be characteristic of IT products and standards that are 
therefore different in character from more traditional com-
modities and subject to different problems not as smoothly 
solvable by markets (Katz/Shapiro 1985, Farrell/Saloner 
1985, Arthur 1996). Various perspectives can be distin-
guished in the literature (Kleinemeyer 1998, Yang 1997). 
Looking at empirical approaches authors mainly try to prove 
the existence of network effects and estimate their values by 
using regression analysis to estimate the hedonic price func-
tion of network effect goods (Hartmann/Teece 1990, Gandal 
1994, Economides/Himmelberg 1995, Moch 1995, Bryn-
jolfsson/Kemerer 1996, Gröhn 1999). Theoretical approaches 
mostly use equilibrium analysis to explain phenomena such 
as the start-up problem (Rohlfs 1974, Oren/Smith 1981, 
Katz/Shapiro 1985, 1994, Wiese 1990, Besen/Farell 1994, 
Economides/Himmelberg 1995), market failure (Far-
rell/Saloner 1985, 1986, Katz/Shapiro 1986, 1992, 1994, 
Gröhn 1999), instability (also called "tippiness") of network 
effect markets (Arthur 1989, 1996, Besen/Farell 1994, Far-
rell/Saloner 1985, Katz/Shapiro 1994, Shapiro/Varian 1998), 
and path dependency (David 1985, Arthur 1989, Besen/Farell 
1994, Katz/Shapiro 1994, Liebowitz/Margolis 1995b).  
These models focus on individual buying decisions, mar-
keting strategies of competing vendors, supply and demand 
equilibria, and welfare implications. Common results are the 
following:  
• In many cases, the existence of network effects leads 
to Pareto-inferior results in markets.  
• Demand-sided positive network effects inhibit multi-
ple equilibria and the market will finally lock-in to a 
monopoly situation with one standard winning total 
market share. 
• Instability is a typical characteristic describing the fact 
that multiple, incompatible technologies can only sel-
dom coexist and that the switch to a single, leading 
standard can come suddenly, leaving some users 
stranded with unsupported products. 
• The start-up problem prevents adoption even of supe-
rior products; excess inertia can occur as no actor is 
willing to bear the overproportional risk of being the 
first adopter of a standard. 
• On the other hand, excess momentum can occur, e.g. if 
a sponsoring firm uses low prices in early periods of 
diffusion to attract a critical mass of adopters. 
• In the case of sponsored technologies there is a possi-
bility to internalize the otherwise more or less lost 
network gains by strategic intertemporal pricing. 
There are private incentives to providing networks that 
can overcome inertia problems; still they do not guar-
antee social optimality per se.  
• The question arises if the laissez-faire of decentralized 
markets should be replaced by centralized state control 
to ensure favorable diffusion of technologies subject to 
network effects.  
While the traditional models greatly contributed to the un-
derstanding of a wide variety of particular (macroeconomic) 
problems associated with the diffusion of standards, they fail 
to explain the phenomenological variety of diffusion courses 
in today’s dynamic information and communication technol-
ogy markets. The examination of network effects is done in a 
rather general way, which does not cover the heterogeneous 
properties of the markets with products such as digital televi-
sion, cellular phones, office software, Internet browsers, or 
EDI-solutions. Furthermore, the specific interaction of poten-
tial adopters within their personal socio-economical envi-
ronment, and potential decentral coordination of network 
efficiency are neglected. As a result, important phenomena of 
modern network effect markets such as the coexistence of 
different products despite strong network effects, the appear-
ance of small but stable clusters of users of a certain solution 
despite the fact that the competition dominates the rest of the 
market, or the fact that strong players in communication 
networks force other participants to use a certain solution can 
not sufficiently be explained by the existing approaches. 
Additionally, few approaches focus on the impact of increas-
ingly important open standards [Gallaugher/Wang 1999]. 
In the remainder of this article, we will first systematically 
reveal deficiencies in the models of positive network effects 
by analyzing common assumptions and conclusions (section 
2), before extending this criticism to the more general prem-
ises of the neo-classical framework (section 3). Based on our 
findings we will identify areas of improvement proposing a 
new approach to model markets with strong positive network 
effects. The article ends with first results of simulations based 
on our framework as a sound basis for further research. 
II. COMMON DRAWBACKS IN TRADITIONAL NETWORK EFFECT 
MODELS 
In contrast to focussing on macroeconomic public policy 
implications, our goal is to use and extend already elaborated 
theoretical findings to support individual decision processes 
associated with the diffusion of standards. We propose the 
hypothesis that assumptions and simplifications implicitly 
and uncritically used for modeling standardization problems 
inevitably lead to the described results such as market failure 
under network effects and that the analysis of the diffusion of 
standards needs to be extended in order to descriptively cap-
ture real world phenomena and be actionable. 
A Direct vs. indirect network effects  
Although the distinction between direct and indirect net-
work effects (introduced by Katz/Shapiro 1985) is almost 
commonplace in the introduction of articles about standards 
there is very little consideration of these differences in the 
models. But  indirect network externalities have different 
economic implications (Katz/Shapiro 1994). Empirical re-
search shows that direct and indirect network effects are 
evaluated differently by potential buyers and also depend on 
the category of the network effect product (Westarp et al. 
1999). Still, the distinction is not carried out in the models, 
adding to the vagueness of their results. 
B Network effects versus network externalities 
Liebowitz/Margolis (1994, 1995a) argue that not all net-
work effects are externalities, in fact. Generally speaking, in 
accordance with traditional literature on economics or exter-
nalities in particular, a network externality exists if market 
participants fail to somehow internalize the impact of a new 
network actor on others; with positive network externalities 
the private value from another actor is smaller than the social 
value, leading to networks smaller than efficient. Although an 
individual standards adopting actor is not likely to internalize 
his effect (from joining the network) on others, in owned 
("sponsored")1 networks there is no essential obstacle to a 
network owner internalizing these effects. Thus, the existence 
of network effects does not necessarily imply market failure, 
especially in the case of competing sponsored technologies. 
Liebowitz/Margolis (1995a) show under what conditions the 
profit maximizing network size is also socially optimal. 
Katz/Shapiro (1986, 825) show problems of sponsored tech-
nologies when competing with unsponsored technologies and 
second-mover advantages, i.e. advantage of one sponsored 
technology that will be superior in the future over another. 
Still, the proposed ubiquity of failing markets remains doubt-
ful. Generally speaking, it appears to be difficult to find ex-
amples of inferior standards having prevailed over superior 
ones, partly because of uncertainty of not pursued paths and 
their results inherent to a not deterministic world and the 
imperfect foresight of individuals (ex ante vs. ex post effi-
ciency)2, and possibly because – in a world with potential 
Schumpeterean entrepreneurs - there is no such situation. The 
reason could be e.g. exhaustible networks effects and hetero-
geneous preferences and therefore parallel or equally desir-
able networks or the fact that most standards are somehow 
supported by actors with patents, copyrights or other forms of 
property rights. A similar argument can be made focussing on 
satisficing instead of maximizing actors. Supposed the 
QWERTY keyboard really is superior (see Lie-
bowitz/Margolis 1990 for a critical discussion) the question 
remains who benefits from being able to type 100 words a 
minute when typing skills restrict one to a fraction of this.3 
This argument somewhat resembles what Liebowitz/Margolis 
call first-degree path dependence: There is a sensitivity to 
early historic events but no implied inefficiency. And if, 
therefore, different standards are equally beneficial after all, 
“efficiency models cannot be expected to predict which of 
several equally efficient possibilities will be chosen” (Lie-
bowitz/Margolis 1995b). 
The point made here is not the irrelevance of externalities but 
rather to raise the question if standards really are that differ-
ent in terms of economic implications from ‘traditional’ 
goods4 and to identify areas of improvement on modeling 
diffusion processes of standards.  
                                                           
1
 A quite commonly adopted terminology distinguishes be-
tween market-mediated diffusion processes of compatibility 
standards (leading to de facto standards) and de jure stan-
dards resulting from either political (“committee”) or admin-
istrative procedures. De facto standards can either be spon-
sored (with certain actors holding property rights and the 
capability to restrain the use of the standard) or unsponsored 
(no actors with proprietary interests). David/Greenstein 
(1990), S. 4. 
2
 This corresponds to what Liebowitz/Margolis call sec-
ond-degree path dependence: Sensitive dependence on early 
events may lead “to outcomes that are regrettable and costly 
to change. They are not, however, inefficient in any meaning-
ful sense, given the assumend limitations on knowledge” 
(Liebowitz/Margolis 1995b).  
3
 “...the QWERTY keyboard appears to be fast enough for 
almost all uses of it. If you are just driving around town you 
do not need a 500 horsepower V8” (Poole 1997) 
4
 If this is the case - with network effects constituting par-
ticular instances of market failure – then and only then tech-
nology policies different from traditional industrial policies 
should be considered. 
C The bigger the better  
The proposition of indefinitely increasing positive network 
effects as described in the literature (e.g. Chou/Shy 1990, 
Katz/Shapiro 1986, Farrell/Saloner 1992) implies natural 
monopolies. If optimal networks under network externalities 
are the size of the whole population (monopolies), all net-
works are too small. If network effects were exhaustible 
multiple networks could coexist. Even though IT might be 
less subject to physical limitations going together with the 
law of diminishing returns, there might be organizational or 
managerial problems restraining optimal network size (Rad-
ner 1992). Thus, the question raised by the existence of tradi-
tionally described network effects is not optimal network size 
but optimal network since inferior standards could battle out  
better ones. While Arthur (1989) proposes an example con-
sisting of one technology that has greater value in earlier but 
smaller in later diffusion stages leading - under increasing 
returns - to (ex post) regrettable market outcomes Lie-
bowitz/Margolis (1995a) argue that "synchronization effects" 
are more likely uniform as there is no difference in the value 
of one more user of videorecorder technology to others in 
either a VHS or Beta network. 
D Homogeneous network effects 
Another limiting assumption is that of similar and actor-
independent valuation of networks and growth of network 
effects. Heterogeneity of preferences can have substantial 
impact on the evaluation of different competing networks as 
well as on the value assigned to new actors. For example, a 
close colleague of an engineer will add more value to the 
engineer’s network than a sociologist from China. Another 
example is VHS with compared to Beta possibly inferior 
picture quality but longer recording times (Poole 1997, Lie-
bowitz/Margolis 1990). Heterogeneous preferences increase 
the chance of efficient coexistence of networks and overcome 
natural monopoly tendencies. Good examples of asymmetric 
partner contingent valuations of network effects can be found 
between intra-group communications standards e.g. used in 
corporate intranets between specialized professionals and the 
inter-group communication standards within and outside that 
same company. Thus, installed base effects cannot be gener-
alized without regard to who is part of the personal network 
and who else uses compatible technologies outside the usual 
interaction scope of the respective individual.  
E Costs of network size 
If optimal networks under network externalities are mo-
nopolies, all networks are too small. This hypothesis only 
holds under constant or falling (average) costs of adding new 
members to a network. The costs of network size are ignored 
in almost all models. Thus network effects are not sufficient 
for natural monopoly and one single standard is not a com-
pulsory social optimum. Instead, there can be optimal net-
work sizes below the entire population and different stan-
dards can coexist. 
F Confusion of Centralized and Decentralized Decision 
Making 
Different instances of standardization problems are subject 
to different institutional backgrounds. For example, in corpo-
rate intranets, there are - at least in principle - different possi-
bilities of approaching strategic situations of interdependent 
actors. Thus, we propose a distinction between centrally and 
decentrally coordinated networks (Westarp et al. 2000). In 
contrast to the distinction between sponsored and unspon-
sored technologies, the institution of centralized control 
within a hierarchy could coordinate dependencies due to 
network effects even of non-proprietary standards. Addition-
ally, autonomous actors could change their institutional 
background by founding and submitting to a central authority 
and therefore transform the problem of market failure to a 
traditional agency problem, for example; this is basically how 
the emergence of enterprises is explained in organization 
theory.  
Additionally, Poole (1997) describes institutional impacts 
of corporate cultures and the associated path dependent prop-
erties on innovation diffusion using the failure of the steam 
locomotive industry in the first half of the 20th century as an 
example. 
G Normative Implications 
Closely related to the problem of designing advantageous 
coordination designs is the need for normative results. 
Whether or not public intervention is necessary in network 
effect markets is a common controversy in the literature. 
Recommendations vary from centralized standard setting or 
restriction of market power by the government on the one 
hand side to total laissez-faire without intervention on the 
other. Since network effects don’t stop at national borders, 
the question arises whether public intervention might be out 
dated. New emerging phenomena like the Internet show the 
power of decentralized coordination while the basic implica-
tions of network effects remain the same. Despite this, ap-
proaches to improve decentralized coordination of standardi-
zation - especially in the context of particular groups of indi-
viduals, e.g. within enterprises -  can not be found in the 
traditional models. Finding advantageous coordination de-
signs, efficient intermediaries and network specific cost and 
incentive structures may lead the way to answer questions as 
of the optimal network size, the trade-off between architec-
tural (open) standards as XML and - based upon these - (pro-
prietary) complementary technologies.  
Thus, most traditional approaches towards diffusion proc-
esses of standards fail to properly consider costs and charac-
ter of network effects and lack consideration of actor contin-
gent knowledge and of institutional personal neighborhood 
structures. 
 
III. GENERAL DRAWBACKS OF THE NEO-CLASSICAL PARADIGM 
Although individual utility maximization, as unanimously 
agreed upon throughout the neoclassical paradigm, should 
not be disputed here, the "Homo oeconomicus" comes with 
further premises, the economic literature on network effects 
quoted above implicitly assumes to hold. What these prem-
ises are and which one of them may default within an inter-
disciplinary context, will be discussed in the sequel. 
However, if (and only if) all of these premises hold, then 
the validity of the following two so-called "fundamental 
theorems of welfare economics" (Hildenbrand 1976) can be 
proven: 
• A competitive total equilibrium always represents a 
Pareto optimal allocation of the total bundle of eco-
nomic goods (a so-called Pareto optimum). 
• For each realizable Pareto optimum a (positive) price 
vector exists, for which this Pareto optimum repre-
sents a competitive equilibrium. 
The goal of an economy thus is to reach a Pareto-optimal 
allocation5 of goods. The ability of the market mechanism to 
accomplish this task (more or less strongly) depends on the 
following implicit assumptions: 
• Absence of Externalities: 
In earlier definitions, an externality was considered to 
be present whenever the utility function Ui(.) of some 
economic agent i includes real variables whose values 
are chosen by another economic agent j without particu-
lar attention to the welfare effect on i’s utility. As shown 
by Coase, the market mechanism may overcome some of 
these problems by adding “property rights” as tradable 
goods to the economy. Therefore, nowadays an external-
ity is said to be present whenever there is insufficient in-
centive for a potential market to be created for some 
good and the non-existence of this market leads to a non-
Pareto-optimal equilibrium. So far, the absence of exter-
nalities is the only premise, network effect literature – as 
discussed above – is trying to relax.  
• Complete rationality of the Homo oeconomicus: 
Network effect literature often relies on the neo-
classical assumption that all agents do not only know 
their own action space and utility function but likewise 
have a complete and realistic model of all the other 
agents' current allocation, action spaces and utility func-
tions as well! In a pure neo-classical "exchange econ-
omy" this assumption may be relaxed and even when we 
only bargain with our direct neighbors the decentralized 
exchange still leads to a unique and Pareto-optimal equi-
librium, but unfortunately only if there are no network 
externalities or indivisibilities (see below). But for 
“realworld” individuals, parametric and strategic (or stra-
tegic and statistical (Williamson 1985)) uncertainty 
(Hayek 1937) imposes constitutional bounds (Hayek 
1994, 171) to the knowledge, their decisions can be 
based upon. Additionally, heterogeneous institutional 
and structural environments influence the decisions of 
individual socio-economic actors. 
Therefore, research in the area of  New Institutional 
Economics (Hodgson 1993) rejects this concept of com-
plete rationality in favor of a "learning" individual and 
search-theoretical models of evolutionary systems. Equi-
librium analysis models are replaced by models of the 
evolution process of the examined multi-agent system, in 
which the optimal action of actor i at time t is modeled as 
function of his individual knowledge at this point in 
time. 
• Exclusion principle:  
Prices only lead to Pareto-optimal collective action in 
a multi-agent system if the exclusion principle applies to 
the goods to be exchanged i.e. unique possession and 
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 An allocation x is considered to be Pareto-optimal if and 
only if no other allocation y exists, which is weakly preferred 
over x by all individuals and strongly preferred by at least 
one individual. 
ownership exists, permitting consumption only to a sin-
gle individual. When common use or free duplication of 
products is possible (as being the case for information 
products like software), the equilibrium price is zero (if 
there were no copyrights artificially restricting this du-
plication as an incentive to the producer). 
• Consumption paradigm : 
Utility is drawn exclusively from consumption, i.e. the 
destruction of resources. The temporary possession of a 
good (like e.g. a piece of art or a game software), which 
is sold to some other individual after some periods, can-
not be evaluated in the utility function. When extending 
the model to a multi-period economy, this inclusion be-
comes possible but immediately destroys the validity of 
price coordination. Especially for information products 
the neo-classical notion of “consumption” (together with 
the exclusion principle mentioned above) poses a major 
obstacle to market coordination. 
However, if not the consumption but the use of the re-
source comes to the center of attention, property rights 
lose their additional potential of generating utility com-
pared to usufruct rights. "Network Economics" of the In-
formation Age has to migrate from a consumer-oriented 
to a user-oriented discipline, in which the efficient solu-
tion of scheduling problems (which resources is used 
when in which process?) will turn out to be a critical 
success factor for an efficient creation of social welfare. 
• Separation of consumers and producers 
The classification of the economic actors into consum-
ers and producers turns out to be problematic in a world 
replacing the classical notion of  “work” more and more 
by freelance activities, thus “mixing” both concepts. In a 
“prosumer economics” we must not neglect the fact that 
human work does “flow out of the power plug socket" 
like energy but humans represent discrete renewable re-
source, whose entire economic and "recovery process" 
must efficiently be synchronized with other individuals 
of the network. 
• Divisibility of resources 
One of the most extensive restrictions certainly is the 
neo-classical assumption of arbitrary divisibility of all 
goods,  i.e. each apple must be permitted to be cut into n 
pieces, sold separately. What may be acceptable for the 
apple, is impossible for screws or information. Interest-
ingly enough, in defense of equilibrium theory it is ar-
gued, that the "rounding error" from unjustified accep-
tance of the divisibility assumption "washes out” for 
large quantities. While this may be true with screws, the 
argument breaks down at least for all  goods, for which 
the optimal quantity of an individual’s use is close to one 
(e.g. automobiles, houses and all information goods). 
• Concave Utility Functions / no complementarities 
The preference orders of the consumers over the bun-
dles of goods must be representable by (strictly) con-
cave, continuous utility functions. How far this assump-
tion misses reality becomes clear if we realize that this 
does not allow for modeling complementary goods al-
though complementarities can be found in all areas from 
recipes (if one ingredient is not available in sufficient 
quantity, the cake cannot be baked) and service indus-
tries (if I’d like to spend a three weeks vacation on an is-
land, the flights without the hotel are equally worthless 
as the hotel without being able to book the flights) to in-
formation (if we do not know the concept of Pareto op-
timality and there is no definition provided, the funda-
mental theorems stated above are of no value to the 
reader). This problem of complementarity is it, which 
renders the “market solution” of scheduling problems 
impossible: If a resource is needed for ten time slices in 
sequence and the process is not preemptive (like with the 
hotel stay), buying the ten time slices in separate auc-
tions leaves me with too high a risk to end up with some 
slices missing. 
• Absence of transaction costs 
Neo-classical economics abstracts from transaction 
costs, i.e. from costs, which are induced by the prepara-
tion or execution of the exchange process. In New Insti-
tutional Economics the effect of transaction costs is ex-
plicitly modeled and for example considered to be one 
reason for the emergence of companies economizing on 
transaction costs by being “islands of more centralized 
control” in a decentralized market. 
IV. TOWARDS AN INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY OF NETWORK 
EFFECTS 
A Required modeling power of an interdisciplinary 
theory of network effects  
After the critique of economic network effect theory and 
the neo-classical paradigm in general the question arises, 
which requirements have to be met by an interdisciplinary 
theory of network effects, allowing to integrate and explain 
social and economic interaction of human actors and auto-
mated agents (e.g. software agents trading at the stock ex-
change). 
• Modeling of knowledge and uncertainty / bounded 
rationality 
The network effect theory must allow for modeling 
knowledge of individual participants (human or automated) 
and uncertainty concerning this knowledge (in particular 
concerning the behavior and knowledge of other participants 
of the multi-actor system, we will call the “society” in the 
sequel). 
• Evolutionary System Dynamics 
However, since assuming bounded rationality usually im-
plies the impossibility of determining analytical (ex ante) 
results for an aggregated entity - such as a whole network 
consisting of individually deciding agents - in terms of the 
existence and/or efficiency of equilibria, a recourse towards 
empirical and simulative approaches seems unavoidable. 
While historic case arguments like the prominent 
QWERTY example (Liebowitz/Margolis 1990) or the battle 
for VCR standards (Liebowitz/Margolis 1994) proved to be 
at least ambiguous6, numerical simulations based upon inter-
                                                           
6
 Poole (1997) identifies another common misconception 
when trying to identify winning inferior standards. He argues 
that the often cited DOS vs. Macintosh example is different 
from e.g. U.S. 110 volt 60 cycle AC vs. European 220 volt 50 
acting software agents can help to get empirical evidence for 
such complex systems giving up complete rationality renders 
the system of interactions to be “unsolvable” to an analytical 
determination of equilibria and proof of their uniqueness. 
Therefore, we must rather rely on simulation of system dy-
namics and analysis of the observed behavior of the simula-
tion model 
• Emergence of system components and links 
The approach should also be able to model the emergence 
of new participants and their "death" in the evolution process 
(to model for example the establishment or dissolution of 
institutional participants) as well as the emergence and disso-
lution of new links between existing actors, i.e. allow for an 
evolution of network structure. 
• Abolishment of  convexity and divisibility assumptions 
Since many of the decisions to be modeled will be discrete 
choice and exhibit interdependence to decisions made by 
other actors, convexity and divisibility assumptions are to-
tally inadequate and thus have to be dropped (which is less 
problematic in a setting that has already given up all hope for 
analytical solvability). 
• Economics of Intermediation 
To overcome the lack of normative results from traditional 
models, a new approach towards a theory of network effects 
should consider institutional designs for managing network 
related dependencies between individual network actors. In 
this context, the role of intermediaries needs to be empha-
sized. Generally speaking, intermediaries can compile and/or 
reallocate information necessary for coordinating dependen-
cies between actors. Considering the uncertainties inherent to 
novel technologies, intermediaries could contribute to solving 
coordination problems associated with positive network ef-
fects. Quite contrary to the prominent hypothesis of disinter-
mediation due to reduced transaction costs on markets, the 
benefits associated with IT such as decreasing communica-
tion and information processing costs appear to be available 
to intermediaries, as well. Thus, a new approach should inte-
grate the analysis of intermediate coordination designs, 
essential data requirements and associated incentives 
problems for intermediaries to contribute to solving 
dependency issues problematic for markets. 
B Alternatives to a Neo-classical Theory of Network 
Effects ? 
As already stated above, New Institutional Economics ex-
plicitly addresses the emergence and function of institutions 
and their change over time. Institutions are considered to be: 
• informal rules (habits) as boundary conditions on the 
social behavior of the individuals 
• formal regulations (laws, property rights or contracts) 
• instruments for the enforcement of formal and informal 
regulations 
Although sharing much of our criticism, Institutional Eco-
nomics often neglects the explicit modeling of any behavioral 
                                                                                                    
cycle AC since the U.S. AC standard is stable and 
DOS/WINTEL is still evolving.  
assumptions for the actors, and therefore neither analytical 
nor simulative equilibrium models can be formulated and 
used for answering the question, which institution is best 
suited to achieve a given social goal. The evolutionary branch 
of Game Theory (Aumann 1994) makes a valuable contribu-
tion to close this gap by mainly focusing on discrete interac-
tion and making all behavioral assumptions explicit. 
While most game-theoretical approaches still strive for 
analytical solutions (and are thus restricted to very small 
models) the research direction of Agent-based Computational 
Economics (ACE) (Vriend 1996, 1999) rejects this goal for 
being able to model more extensive multi-agent systems with 
complex behavioral structure, based on a discrete (often dis-
tributed) “state-transition” system model. It should be undis-
puted through all disciplines, that the following "labeled state 
transition system (LST)" as basic model of the real world 
would not come with any serious restrictions of modeling 
power: 
In each state si ∈ STATES a subset of the society’s actors 
is able to execute an action of type act which lets the system 
change its state to sj . The transitions are labeled because they 
do not only describe the transition from one state to another, 
but additionally have to distinguish, which agent initiated this 
transition. Formally, this may be modeled by L-
TRANSITIONS ⊆ STATES × ACTORS × ACTIONS × 
STATES. 
If (for each participant) there exists a preference order over 
all paths (chains of transitions) of  this LST system, it be-
comes possible to not only compare different target states of 
the systems but also to evaluate different paths of reaching 
the same target. The social goal now is to find an institutional 
setting that lets the LST system take a path which is Pareto-
efficient and maximizes or fulfills one or a set of postulated 
“justice criteria”. 
Unfortunately, an immense complexity problem results 
from this introduction of path-dependent preferences. As a 
compromise we may of course restrict ourselves to social 
preference relations over the “outcome” of the process - in 
those cases in which an equilibrium is reached - and only 
analyze the impact of institutional settings on this equilib-
rium. 
Of course, in such a general setting we might ask whether 
all of the multi-actor networks of cooperating and competing 
“players” should still be called “economies” or what criteria 
of a multi-actor network game are necessary or sufficient to 
call it an economic one. Although there seems to be no una-
nimity, a plausible criteria to distinguish a general social 
game from the subclass of economic games could be “trans-
ferable utility”, presupposing that among other objects there 
is at least one (common!) class of objects (e.g. money or 
gold) having the property that the utility of every individual 
(strictly monotonously) grows with the amount of endow-
ment. For a game of chess or soccer this does not hold or at 
least paying the other side for letting me win is considered 
“against the rules”, i.e. breaks the institutional setting of 
chess or soccer games. Once transferability is given, the 
problem of finding the optimal action sequence can be sepa-
rated from the distribution of the welfare (e.g. by taxation). 
Note, however, that transferability of utility does not imply 
by any means that the welfare maximization problem may 
efficiently be solved by a decentralized market mechanism. 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS 
We developed a simulation model of an agent-based com-
putational economy which addresses some of the important 
requirements outlined above. So far, it should be seen as a 
first step in the direction of evaluating and improving our 
approach of an interdisciplinary theory of network effects 
rather than a completed study. In the following we will only 
present the basics of the model and the simulations results. 
For a comprehensive description refer to Westarp/Wendt 
(2000) and Wendt/Westarp (2000). 
Our simulation is based on a simple model of the individ-
ual buying decision in network effect markets. A participant 
buys a certain product exhibiting network effects whenever 
the benefits (sum of stand-alone benefits and network effect 
benefit; the latter depending on the number of other adopters 
that are linked to this participant) are larger than the costs. In 
case of competing products in a market, the consumer buys 
the product with the maximum surplus if this exceeds 0. The 
decision is discrete, meaning that it is not rational to buy or 
use more than one unit of the same product or even of differ-
ent products. This is an assumption which especially makes 
sense for information goods like software or telecommunica-
tion products. The network effects in the utility function only 
depend on decision behavior of the direct communication 
network of the potential buyer. This assumption is confirmed 
by empirical research in the software markets (Westarp et al. 
1999) and also pays tribute to the bounded rationality of real-
world actors. Therefore, in contrast to the installed base of 
traditional models, we distinguish between relevant and ir-
relevant network effects.  
All simulations are based on the simplifying assumption 
that network structure, the consumers' preferences and the 
prices of the network effect products are constant during the 
diffusion process. All networks had a size of 1,000 consum-
ers. We also tested our simulations for other network sizes 
without significant difference in the general results. A total 
number of 10,000 independent simulations were run until an 
equilibrium was reached, each iteration of the respective run 
showing one state of the network during the evolution proc-
ess. To analyze the diffusion process the distribution of prod-
ucts reached in this equilibrium was then condensed into the 
Herfindahl index used in industrial economics to measure 
market concentration (e.g. Tirole 1993). All entities of our 
model were implemented in JAVA 1.1 and their behavior 
was simulated on a discrete event basis. 
Our main hypothesis was that the (macro) dynamics of 
network effect markets as multi-actor systems not only de-
pends on the individual (micro) decisions of the participants 
but also on personal neighborhood structures reflecting insti-
tutional patterns of networks. The influence of various deter-
minants on the diffusion process of network effects goods 
such as price, heterogeneity of preferences, and connectivity, 
centrality, and topology of networks were tested. The results 
strongly support our hypotheses.  
• The effects of cost and stand alone utility were ana-
lyzed by varying price and the heterogeneity of pref-
erences. In high price markets we find more diversity 
of products, due to the higher switching costs. We did 
not find any significant dependency between hetero-
geneity and market concentration for close topolo-
gies7, but a slight but significant negative correlation 
for random topologies. 
• The influence of the networks topology on the diffu-
sion of innovations in networks was proven. While the 
close topology generally is the basis for a greater di-
versity of products (since clusters or groups of con-
sumers may decide relatively independent from diffu-
sion processes in the rest of the market), the random 
topology tends to dominance of one or few products. 
• Intensity of communication (represented by connec-
tivity) is the source of personal network exposure 
within the diffusion process and is shown to have a 
positive effect on equilibrium concentration. 
• Intra-group pressure positively correlates with close-
ness of the network’s topology and closeness is shown 
to negatively correlate with concentration8, meaning 
that although this pressure enforces group conformity, 
it also inhibits inter-group conformity. 
• Opinion leadership has been simulated by centrality 
and heterogeneity of node sizes (the latter was used to 
represent the strength of influence on others). We find 
a positive correlation between centrality and concen-
tration, showing that some central participants can 
significantly influence the diffusion process. Differ-
ences in power within the network did not have any 
effect on concentration unless it was combined with 
centrality.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The increasing pace of advances in information and com-
munication technology and the associated emphasis on com-
patibility standards constituting networks has brought diffu-
sion processes of standards to a broad public and academic 
attention. A common finding is the existence of network 
effects, i.e. the increasing value of a network as the number 
of its users increases (demand side economies of scale) lead-
ing in many cases to Pareto-inferior results of standardization 
processes.  
We propose the hypothesis that assumptions and simplifi-
cations implicitly and uncritically used for modeling stan-
dardization problems fail to explain the phenomenological 
variety of diffusion courses in today's dynamic markets and 
lead inevitably to the described results such as market failure 
under network effects. In addition, the particular socio-
economical environment of interacting adopters is neglected.  
We have shown methodological deficiencies of traditional 
approaches concerning network effects. Together with a 
                                                           
7
 The network topology is generated by either choosing the 
c closest neighbors measured by euclidean distance (close 
topology) or selecting c neighbors randomly from all n-1 
possible neighbors (random topology). 
8
 As a direct measure of intra-group pressure we calculated 
the „relative 2nd order radiality“, being the sum of the number 
of indirect neighbors of each node divided by the hypotheti-
cal maximum of indirect neighbors (if there were no double 
nominations by any direct neighbor). This measure positively 
correlates (.405) with concentration, since a low value indi-
cates strong intra-group links and thus resistance to outside 
pressure.  
critical examination of the neo-classical paradigm we propose 
a requirements framework towards an interdisciplinary theory 
of network effects.  
An interdisciplinary network theory should incorporate, 
among others, uncertainty and bounded rationality on behalf 
of the deciding network actors as well as evolutionary system 
dynamics, i.e. the emergence of new or the 'death' of existing 
actors in an evolutionary process. The complexity resulting 
from these propositions requires empirical methodologies and 
simulation models in particular. As a first step towards ex-
tending theories in the proposed direction we developed a 
model showing that the dynamics of networks do not only 
depend on individual decisions but also on their personal 
neighborhood structures reflecting institutional patterns. 
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